Papers Certification Process for Elections Hardware and Software (NASED.org) "Once you know what your system must do to meet the criteria of the FVSS and you have your system ready to be examined by NASED's Independent Test Authorities (ITA), you contact the appropriate test authority for entering the process. Your contacts and contracts are directly between the ITA and your firm. You can save major time and money by having all of your written documentation of design, operations, technical data package, source code, and maintenance manuals developed and thoroughly documented before contacting the ITA." Editor's Note: Only one company is listed as an Independent Test Authority (ITA) for hardware, Wyle Laboratories. Only one company is listed as an ITA for software, CIBER, Inc. 5-05 Editorial: Certification Process Flawed (VoteTrustUSA.org - Gideon) "What is clear is that the testing and certification system is set up in the interest of the vendors, and the public interest takes a backseat." 5-05 Editorial: Conflict of Interest in Setting Voting Machine Standards (VoteTrustUSA.org - Gideon) "Those who have conflicts of interest usually say they can still maintain objectivity, but the rules on conflicts of interest put no weight on those kinds of self-serving statements. It is apparent that, in appointing Dr. Williams and Mr. Craft to the committee, NASED 'stacked the deck' with pro-industry partisans. "The committee's proceedings on April 20/21 reveal that the standards established by this committee will be heavily favorable to the voting machine industry and not necessarily what is in the public interest. What this committee is doing is tantamount to the federal government allowing the baby crib industry to write their own safety standards for cribs. If that had been done, poorly designed cribs would still be causing the deaths of thousands of babies every year." 5-05 Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter (California Secretary of State) "This report summarizes the results of our review of some of the source code for the Diebold AV-OS optical scan (version 1.96.6) and the Diebold AV-TSx touchscreen (version 4.6.4) voting machines. The study was prompted by two issues: (1) the fact that AccuBasic scripts associated with the AV-OS and AV-TSx had not been subjected to thorough testing and review by the Independent Testing Authorities when they reviewed the rest of the code for those systems, and (2) concern over vulnerabilities demonstrated in the AV-OS optical scan system by Finnish investigator Harri Hursti in Leon County, FL. Mr. Hursti showed that it is possible for someone with access to aremovable memory card used with the AV-OS system to modify scripts (small programs written in Diebold's proprietary AccuBasic language) that are stored on the card, and also to modify the vote counts stored on the card, in such a way that the tampering would aect the outcome of the election and not be detected by the subsequent canvass procedures." 02-06 Security Standards for Elections Hardware and Software (SIMS) "Voting systems shall deploy protection against the many forms of threats to which they may be exposed such as file and macro viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs. Vendors shall develop and document the procedures to be followed to ensure that such protection is maintained in a current status." Editor's Note: No test or assessment was included in the standards to preclude software or firmware with malicious code embedded from the vendor, one of the most likely possible sources of election mischief or fraud. 5-05

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